Dialectic as a living form. Hegel's dialectical reason

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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to show how reason moves through living forms of thinking, or rather, through living concepts. The first part of this paper will deal with the contradiction. Part two is dedicated to the concept, since it is an essential moment of reason. The living movement of the concept leads to the third part, which deals with life and the living (das Lebendige) within logic. In conclusion, a brief outlook will be given on how to go further in thinking with this concept of reason.

Keywords: Hegel, Dialectic, Contradiction, Life, Living Form, Concept.

Introductory remarks

The understanding determines, and holds the determination fixed. Reason is negative and dialectical, since it dissolves the determinations of the understanding into nothing; it is positive, since it generates the universal, and comprehends the particular therein.¹

Thus Hegel describes reason as opposed to the understanding in the “preface” to the first edition of the Science of Logic in 1812. The thinking of understanding is determined by separation, whereas dialectical reason is able to unite these separations through its activity. Reason is in truth mind (Geist) which in its movement constitutes dialectical reason and understanding. In spirit, then, understanding and reason are contained. Kant has already emphasized a difference between the understanding and rational thinking, but, in Hegel's words, reason for Kant was "the faculty of the unconditioned, that grasps the conditioned character of these acquaintances with things, gathered from experience [Erfahrungskenntnisse].² According to Kant, the understanding only deals with the conditional and the finite. Reason remains the abstract ‘I’ or thinking, which has only pure identity as its object. In this way it excludes the opposition and therefore its overcoming. This difference, as Hegel emphasizes in the "Preliminary Concept" (Vorbegriff) of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences (Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse), is only to be hinted at here in order to show how Hegel depicts reason, which generates the general and comprehends the particular in it. These problems can be discussed from many perspectives, and they have often been developed by scholars, especially in relation to the philosophy of law, history and religion, as well as in relation to Hegel’s systematic works.³ Here we are dealing with an aspect of reason as it appears in the Science of Logic, already mentioned in the opening quotation. The aim of this paper is to show how reason moves through living forms of thinking, or rather, through living concepts. After all, Kant's philosophy examines the forms of thinking and asks whether one can know the truth through these forms. These forms of thinking thus become the object of investigation in Kant, and Hegel criticises Kant's project using a metaphor.

...but to want to know before one knows is as incoherent as the Scholastic's wise resolution to learn to swim, before he ventured into the water.⁴

So you have to be in the water, i.e., in cognition, in order to (re)cognize cognition. Swimming can only be learned by swimming in the water, and cognition can only be learned by cognizing, which according to Hegel is always already in the absolute. In the following, Hegel describes how he himself seeks to comprehend thinking and the forms of thinking.

It is quite correct not to use the forms unexamined, but the examination itself is already activity and cognition of these forms. So their activity and their criticism must be united in them. These forms of thought must be considered in and for themselves; they are the object and the activity of the object itself, they examine themselves, they must define their limit in themselves for themselves and display their deficiency.⁵

In dialectical thought, the forms of thought are the object of investigation, and they are at the same time the activity of the object itself.⁶ The process in which this identity of form of thought or concept and object comes about has already been developed by Hegel in the Phenomenology of Mind. Thinking is therefore the content and the form of logic. "Accordingly, logic is to be understood as the system of pure reason, as the realm of pure thought."⁷ In this sense, Hegel also criticizes conventional types of logic in which (according to his description) the logical forms are dead.

Scattered in fixed determinations and thus not held together in organic unity, they are dead forms and the spirit which is their vital concrete unity does not reside in them.⁸

With these forms, their content or matter is sought outside of themselves. So one tries to look for the fundamental or substantial elsewhere than in the form itself.

But logical reason is itself the substantial or real factor which, within itself, holds together all the abstract determinations and constitutes their proper, absolutely concrete, unity.⁹
Reason, then, is this substantial fundament in which the logical forms are united. Thus, Hegelian reason is characterized by the fact that it produces unity. If a unity has to be produced, then a state is presupposed which was not unity (Einheit) but multiplicity (Vielheit). For Hegel, this multiplicity is contradictory. Therefore, in order to achieve unity, the contradictions have to be overcome or sublated (aufgehoben) in some way. Accordingly, the first part of this paper will deal with the contradiction. Part two is dedicated to the concept, since it is an essential moment of reason. The living movement of the concept leads to the third part, which deals with life and the living (das Lebendige) within logic. In conclusion, a brief outlook will be given on how to go further in thinking with this concept of reason.

I. The contradiction

Already in his essay on The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy of 1801, Hegel concedes to reason that it can unite contradictions and oppositions such as those of reason and sensuality (Sinnlichkeit), of intelligence and nature, and of absolute subjectivity and absolute objectivity. "The sole interest of Reason is to suspend such rigid antitheses."10 To prevent the misunderstanding that reason wants to overcome or even abolish the oppositions, Hegel continues:

But this does not mean that Reason is altogether opposed to opposition and limitation. For the necessary dichotomy is One factor in life. Life eternally forms itself by setting up oppositions, and totality at the highest pitch of living energy (in der höchsten Lebendigkeit) is only possible through its own re-establishment out of the deepest fission. What Reason opposes, rather, is just the absolute fixity which the intellect gives to the dichotomy; and it does so all the more if the absolute opposites themselves originated in Reason.11

Already at this point, then, the contradiction or division is mentioned as a characteristic of life, which forms itself in this movement of separation and union. The significance of life for the dialectical movement can already be seen in the so-called Fragment of a System (Systemfragment) of 1800. There Hegel speaks of life as the "union [Verbindung] of union and non-union [Nicht-verbindung]"12 which prefigures the identity of identity and non-identity of the logic of essence. In this way the concept of life of the early Hegel already points to the significance of life in his later works.

How, i.e. in which way or with which method the unity and thus the contradiction can be thought, is shown by Hegel only in the Science of Logic from 1812 onward, and so now we have to examine the Logic more closely. As the first step in thinking, reason and contradiction are considered.

But thoughtful reason sharpens, as it were, the blunt difference of diverse terms, the mere manifold of representation, to essential distinction, to opposition. Only when driven to the extreme of contradiction are the many of that manifold quickened and alive to each other: they hold the negativity in them which is the inner pulse of self-movement and life.13 Here too, as in the early Differenzschrift, reason is ascribed the ability to contain differences and oppositions, and it is its activity which activates contradiction and thus liveliness. In the logic of essence, where contradiction is treated as a determination of reflection (Reflexionsbestimmung), Hegel describes it (i.e. contradiction) as "the root of movement and life."14 Movement, activity and drive (Trieb) belong to the same context.15 Everything that contains the contradiction is alive.16 Therefore, since logic contains contradiction, it is alive. Here it becomes apparent that the method of logic, and indeed also the logic of essence, demands some kind of liveliness of its own accord. It moves through living forms of thinking. At the end of Logic, in the chapter on the absolute Idea, negativity is mentioned and at the same time the negative of the negative, i.e. the sublation of the contradiction. This sublation does not belong to external reflection, but it is the "innermost, objective moment of life of spirit, by virtue of which there is a subject, a person, is free."17 Here, too, life is thought of as a form of thinking in the context of the logical form of sublation. Contradiction is an essential component of logic; without it, it would have no movement and thus no liveliness. In this context, Hegel also criticizes Kant's doctrine of the antinomies by saying:

It is an excessive tenderness for the world to keep contradiction away from I, to transfer it to spirit instead, to reason, and to leave it there unresolved.18

According to Kant, there ought to be no contradiction in the world. It remains a component of reason and of spirit.19 For Hegel, too, spirit contains the contradiction, but in contrast to Kant's concept of spirit, according to Hegel spirit is capable of tolerating and of dissolving it. Hegel, too, finds contradiction in the world; however, according to him the world cannot tolerate it, so that it is always in the process of coming into being and passing away. The movement that constitutes the Science of Logic passes through the concept, and so in the second step the concept is to be examined more closely.

II. The Concept

In the Critique of Pure Reason the concepts spring from the understanding; the understanding is thus the capacity of the concept. Kant further defines the following for the concept:

Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. It is thus just as necessary to make the mind's concepts sensible (i.e., to add an object to them in intuition) as to make its intuitions understandable (i.e., to bring them under concepts).20

For Kant, concepts are only valid as relations of the manifold given by intuition. In this way, the concept becomes the fundament of finite determination and of the manifold. Now one should expect, Hegel concludes, that the concept in reason would lose the conditionality with
which it still appears at the stage of understanding and would attain perfect truth.

But this expectation is disappointed. For Kant defines the relation of reason to the categories as merely dialectical. Indeed, he even takes the result of this dialectic to be simply and solely an infinite nothingness, the result being that the synthesis is again lost, lost also to the infinite unity of reason, and lost with it is whatever beginning there was of a speculative, truly infinite, concept [...].  

This fate, then, is suffered by the concept in Kant's philosophy. For Hegel, on the other hand, the rational concept is the absolute Idea, which is reached at the end of the Logic.

Reason, which is the sphere of the Idea, is the self-unveiled truth in which the concept attains the realization absolutely adequate to it, and is free inasmuch as in this real world, in its objectivity, it recognizes its subjectivity, and in this subjectivity recognizes that objective world.

This quotation expresses the relationship or connection between reason, idea and concept, which are at the highest level of the Logic. The goal of logical movement is thus the freedom of the concept, and that is to say, the mediation of the subjective and the objective, so that the one can be found in the other.

Concepts for Hegel are "living movements". Moreover, Hegel speaks in the Doctrine of the Concept of a "living concept", which is now to be rediscovered. Hegel ascribes life or liveliness (Lebendigkeit) to concepts, because they are living movements. The question is what Hegel means by this concept of the living. Is the characterization of the logic as living perhaps only a metaphorical expression for something else? This question can be answered with "No". Hegel's talk of living forms of thinking and their representation cannot be interpreted as metaphors, for the concept of life has a constitutive meaning for the movement in and of the Science of Logic. If the identity of form and content is to assert itself, a logic that moves through living forms of thinking must also have the concept of life as its object in terms of content. Accordingly, Hegel says that a logic of empty and dead forms of thinking cannot contain a content like the idea of life. A logic characterized by the living concept must therefore show how life is determined. Thus the concept of life has its place in the Doctrine of the Concept, where the given "ossified, material" of traditional logic is to be made "fluid again", and the living concept is to be rekindled "in such a dead matter". Without life, the Idea to which the Logic leads, or the True (and thus also the entire Hegelian logic), would be something empty and indeterminate, as Hegel himself says. Reason is to be found at the level of the Idea, i.e. at the highest level and therefore in the last section of the Logic. At this stage the concept has freed itself from itself, since it is no longer confronted with a world or an object as something foreign, but recognizes itself in the world and the world recognizes itself in it. So the concept is the rational (das Vernünftige). Now, in the third part, life is to be considered with regard to reason.

III. The living

For Hegel, the Idea in which concept and reality form a unity is the rational. Hegel argues as follows:

The Idea as concept is already soul, but it has not yet grasped itself. On this first stage of the immediate Idea, it must first go through life, i.e. the Idea is here only in the form of singularity (Einzelnheit), until through the reflection of its absolute process it sublates this singularity, so that it sublates the last remnant of externality and becomes generality (Allgemeinheit). If a logic is to find its telos in the absolute Idea, in which concept and objectivity are one, then life, which represents the immediate Idea and thus becomes a prerequisite for the absolute Idea, must also find its place in this logic. Without life, the idea and therefore the True (das Wahre) or the entire Hegelian logic would only be something empty and indeterminate; in this way, it would not satisfy the claim of the Absolute. So now Hegel has to show how this concept of life can be conceived. A brief summary of life shall now be given.

Only the prerequisites of the pure concept belong in a logic insofar as "they have the form of pure thoughts". So this cannot be an objective reality of nature; what is at stake here is a "logical life as idea". Hegel himself recognizes the difficulty that the concept of life brings with it, since it also finds an important place in the philosophy of nature and of spirit, and maintains a relationship to (empirical) reality. Therefore, he feels compelled to take a distance towards these areas. So it must now be stated that the life of the Idea has no preconditions in nature; its precondition is only the concept. The externality attached to life in logic is thus not related to reality, but is externality on the level of the concept, so that Hegel can say that the concept has not yet been completely liberated at this stage of the immediate Idea. The objectivity that life also has in logic is thus already permeated by the concept.

Contrary to life in the philosophy of nature and in the philosophy of spirit, life in the Logic is the absolute generality which has no preconditions in objectivity, since the latter is already determined by the concept. But Hegel also points out the difficulty and the tension in which life, which contains multiplicity (Vielheit) too, finds itself. On the one hand for thinking, when it tries to grasp life or multiplicity, "all its thoughts are absolutely of no avail" so that life remains an incomprehensible mystery. This statement, very unusual in the Logic, is based on the fact that the infinite external multiplicity is an absolute contradiction for reflection, although the reality of this multiplicity undoubtedly exists, and even reflection has to "admit" its idea. On the other hand, life is at the same time led back from multiplicity to unity through the general drive (Trieb) of the specific, namely to negative unity. As this negative unity of its objectivity, it can refer to itself. Thus, as a singular, it can refer to the objectivity it is confronted with as something else. It therefore has the ability to separate itself and can separate itself from the objective as a subjective substance. With the description of this movement, Hegel thus solves the problem of the relationship between life and exteriority by recognizing that life can constitute itself as a negative
unit of the concept, although he is unable to unravel the "incomprehensible mystery" described above, for the exterior multiplicity remains despite the logical movement. These results, i.e. the logical determination of life lead Hegel to the insight that life is divided into three forms.

The first stage of life is "the living individual" (das lebendige Individuum). It is "the idea in the form of singularity (Einzelheit) as simple but negative self-identity: [...]." This statement needs explaining, and it must be noted that here we still have to do with the form of singularity. Hegel describes living objectivity, since it is thus "animated" by the concept, in terms of the determinations of generality, particularity and singularity which are found in sensitivity (universality), irritability (particularity) and reproduction (singularity). Here Hegel argues in terms of the Doctrine of the Concept, drawing a parallel between the concepts of the Doctrine of the Concept with those of the animal organism, as he develops it in the encyclopedic philosophy of nature. With sensitivity (Sensibilität), the immediate universality is given as it absorbs the externality within itself. With irritability (Irritabilität), however, the concept turns into something particular, it "particularizes" itself (es besondert sich). By virtue of irritability, the living can relate to an exteriority or objectivity and interact with it in reciprocal causality (Wechselwirkung). Through this ability, the living can divide itself into species. Finally, the living exists also as a singular (Einzelnes). Thus reproduction is the third form, and it turns out to be the presupposition of the first two forms. Now Hegel has shown how the living individual, which initially refers to itself, also refers to an other, i.e. to the objective world. All in all, the living individual presents itself as a process-like singular, confronted with an objectivity, an outer world which is still indifferent to it.

Now, through this objective exteriority the individual, which in its second form, as an independent being, is taken up in a "life-process", finds itself in absolute contradiction to the dependent objectivity, and feels this contradiction as pain. So here the contradiction, which is described in the Doctrine of Essence as a living one, becomes a phenomenon of existence and an extra-logical phenomenon within the living. "It is said that contradiction cannot be thought; but in the pain of the living being it is even an actual, concrete existence." The ability of the living to feel and to endure pain should be the impetus for the living to find its identity. The aim of the movement should be that the individual is no longer alien to the objective world, but finds itself within it. Pain is at first the beginning of the drive (Trieb), and the living can therefore find its identity, because the identity is in the drive, which can at the same time relate to the outside world. Extremity is transformed into internality by this train of thought, which connects with the pain of the individual. Thus the living can be identical with itself and with the externality, which means that it can be the negative unity of the negative and therefore the general.

So now the transition to a general is made. The living individual is identical in the "genus" (Gattung) with its being other. Here it can relate to an other without this being a something foreign and exterior to it. With the genus the truth and perfection of life is attained, but the Idea is still at the level of immediacy. Now the living has reached the genus, but the genus is not for itself. At this stage, only the other living being is for it. But the genus strives to realize itself as something general. In the process of the genus, the singularity of the living is necessarily sublated and becomes the generality of the Idea. Life or living individuality thus form the presupposition for "Cognition", inasmuch as it dies and the spirit as the general can emerge in this way. So far the content side of life should now have been developed, but Hegel also uses the concept of life in methodological and formal respects in the adjective form - "living" or "alive" (lebendig)- or in the substantive form as "liveliness" (Lebendigkeit) to characterize his logic.

In his work, Hegel repeatedly distances himself from existing types of logic. To them he attributes dead form and "spiritlessness" or "lack of spirit" (Geistlosigkeit), whereas his logic represents a concrete, living unity. What he understands by this unity he declares in the "General Introduction to Logic" of 1832, in which he describes what constitutes his logic.

Accordingly, logic was defined as the science of pure thought – the science that has pure knowledge for its principle and is a unity which is not abstract but living and concrete, so that the opposition of consciousness between a being subjectively for itself, and another but objectively existing such being, has overcome in it. [...].

The liveliness and the concreteness of unity are thus guaranteed by the fact that both moments, the subjective and the objective, are at the same time inseparable and distinct. In the introductory sentences of the section on life in the Doctrine of the Concept, Hegel addresses the problem that, with the concrete and real object of the Idea of life, he seems to transcend the field of logic; however, a logic which is characterized exclusively by empty and dead forms of thinking cannot contain this Idea of life as content. From this assertion of Hegel it can be concluded that, in contrast to conventional types of logic, his logic comprises living forms of thinking.

The living form is therefore a prerequisite for a living content. It can thus be said that the living form of logic is a prerequisite for the content of the concept of life, and because of this liveliness of logic the concept of life itself must also be developed in the logic. For reason, "which is the sphere of the idea," this means that its activity encompasses the living or the living movement.

Concluding remark

The tripartite division of the paper into contradiction, concept and life was not intended to represent an ascent to more and more fulfilled concepts in Hegel's sense. The aim was to show contexts in which dialectical reason is thought in the Science of Logic. Not all aspects that characterize dialectical reason in the Logic could be taken into account here. But it already follows from what has been described that reason is thought of as an activity. Here one encounters a reason that is not a rigid instrument with which one can cognize something foreign,
something lying outside of it, but which is itself moving and active. In this way, reason now has to unite the opposites which it itself engenders. In the above quote from the *Science of Logic* it is said that reason has to produce the general and comprehend the particular in it. Thus the particular is not buried or destroyed by the unification of reason, but it is conceived (begriffen). The presuppositions that dialectical reason demands of itself, and the difficulties that are connected with Hegel's critique of Kant's critique of reason, could not be worked out within the limits of the present text. This would require to give an overview over the entire *Logic* and even the entire Hegelian system. It remains to be noted, however, that Hegel's dialectical reason implies a thinking of the Absolute. Whether this thinking of the Absolute or dialectical reason inevitably leads to aporia, or whether the Absolute is a necessity of thinking, should and cannot be decided at this point. What should have become clear, though, is how logic and life in the sense of Hegel can reasonably be combined. A way of thinking presents itself here, in which reality is mediated with the living concept through living forms of thinking. According to Hegel, the "determination of the human being, its vocation, is rational thought." This determination distinguishes the human being from the animal. Man himself is thinking, and this is his existence and reality. Now thinking in Hegelian thinking must always look at itself. So it looks at its own head. Thinking is object and means or method at the same time. In Hegelian logic, subjective thinking is not opposed to objectivity or reality as something foreign or dominant. This conception offers us a model of how thinking itself or the concept finds itself in reality and vice versa, how reality is in thinking. Form and content correspond to each other and thus form a living whole that moves within itself and in which the rational human being can move freely, thinking and understanding.

Notes

4. This picture frequently used by Hegel can also be found in several places in the lecture notes on "Logic and Metaphysics", cf.: G. W. F. Hegel, *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline*. Part I: Science of Logic, p. 38.
8. Ibid., p. 27.
9. Ibid., p. 28.

42 Cf. footnote 1.

43 Andreas Arndt, for example, has developed a "reconstruction" of the concept of reason from rationalism to classical empiricism, Kant, Fichte, early idealistic early romantic positions, Hegel, and thinkers of the 20th century. With his résumé on Hegel's dialectical reason there is a statement that Hegel's conception of reason cannot accept unreservedly for contemporary thinking. "Hegels Versuch, die äußerliche Grenze der Vernunft in den Vernunftbegriff selbst aufzuheben und dadurch zum absoluten Wissen hin zu überschreiten, mußte in Aporien verlaufen, sofern die so entgrenzte Vernunft als absolute für die endliche Reflexion empirischer Subjekte nicht mehr vollziehbar war, sondern selbst nur äußerlich nachvollzogen werden konnte", en A. Arndt, Dialektik und Reflexion. Zur Rekonstruktion des Vernunftbegriffs, Hamburg, 1994, p. 341.