[Home] | [Publications] | Working Papers | [ Teaching] | [ Research Grants] | [CV] |

This paper investigates whether short-term momentum and long-term reversal may emerge from the wealth reallocation process taking place in speculative markets. We assume that there are two classes of investors who trade long-lived assets by holding constantly rebalanced portfolios based on their beliefs. Provided beliefs, and thus portfolios, are sufficiently diversified, all investors survive in the long-run and, due to waves of mispricing, the resulting equilibrium returns exhibit long-term reversal. If, moreover, asset dividends are positively correlated, investors’ profitable trades become positively correlated too, thus generating short-term momentum in equilibrium returns. We use the model to replicate the performance of the Winners and Losers portfolios highlighted by the empirical literature and to provide insights on how to improve upon them. Finally, we show that dividend positive autocorrelation is positively related to momentum and negatively related to reversal while diversity of beliefs is positively related to both momentum and reversal. (submitted)

The Wisdom of the Crowd applied to financial markets asserts that prices, an average of agents' beliefs, are more accurate than individual beliefs. However, a market selection argument implies that prices eventually reflect only the beliefs of the most accurate agent. In this paper, we show how to reconcile these alternative points of view. In markets in which agents naively learn from equilibrium prices, a dynamic Wisdom of the Crowd holds. Market participation increases agents' accuracy, and equilibrium prices are more accurate than the most accurate agent. If we replace naive learning with Bayes' rule, this positive result disappears.

We provide sufficient conditions for the persistence or transience of stochastic processes on the line based on the sign of the conditional drift. Our findings extend previous results in the literature to the large class of discrete time processes with bounded increments.

In this paper we investigate the side effects of risk pooling activity of an aggregate financial sector upon the dynamics of a productive economy. We build a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agent and fragmented financial markets. Due to exposure to idiosyncratic risk factors and partial market incompleteness, heterogeneous entrepreneurs are willing to mitigate the risk of their portfolio by purchasing riskless claims from the financial sector. While the former has no leverage, the latter leverage its balance-sheet by shorting a risk free bond. The risk pooling role of the financial sector generates cycles with real spillover effects of which financial sector relative capitalisation is the core driver. This structure stems, at the equilibrium, a non-trivial ergodic distribution of wealth and a dynamics through which the system may float for long periods far from its steady state. We focus then on welfare effects of static leverage constraints upon the financial sector. When the financial sector is undercapitalised, the share of pooled idiosyncratic risk is suboptimal. As long as the leverage constraint binds, a reduced volatility of relative wealth share (state diffusion) is associated with a diminished speed of recovery of the financial sector (state drift). In the long run, tighter limits upon leverage generate an overweighted left tail of relative wealth distribution due to a sticky transition through the constrained region of the state space. Moreover, we find out that the financial sector’s expected welfare is monotonically decreasing in leverage constraints, whereas the same does not hold for entrepreneurs.

This paper investigates the intergenerational dynamics of norms in a heterogeneous population divided into two cultural groups. In their adult life, agents are randomly matched in pairs to play a 2 × 2 strategic game. Norms are preferences over actions and thus interact with material payoffs, and as such, they have an effect on Nash Equilibria. In turn, games influence norms because actions played in equilibrium reinforce the corresponding norm. At the end of their life, parents myopically transmit their norms to offspring that actively choose their own norm taking into account both the inherited norms and the norms of their peers. The socialization level depends on how much actions conform to the population mean. In our model, stable norms emerge as a steady state outcome of the joint dynamics of norms, actions, and socialization levels. We exploit this model to study of cultural convergence and the arising of oppositional cultures. For all strategic environments, both convergence and divergence of norms can arise as stable outcomes. Moreover, we find that complement or substitution environments can produce different equilibria, with partial convergence or divergence. At the end, we provide indications for policy intervention, showing that there exist cases where simple policies can induce very different norms and cases where more drastic interventions are needed.

Last modified: Wed May 22 10:33:38 CET 2013 |